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MARITIME DECEPTION AND CONCEAlMENT
 the post–Cold War interlude during which U.s. maritime access to and within overseas regions of grand-strategic importance faced few challenges 
was a historical anomaly. accordingly, in January 2012 the department of de-
fense (dod) formally recognized in its Joint operational access concept (JoaC) 
document that this pause is ending and that joint capability requirements must 
be revisited. the JoaC establishes benchmarks for developing the doctrine, 
training priorities, warfare systems and matériel, organizational structures, and 
other measures necessary to overcome advanced maritime-denial capabilities 
across all warfare domains.1 Woven throughout the JoaC is the need to disrupt 
or neutralize the theater-wide surveillance and reconnaissance networks that 
strategic competitors are developing to provide their maritime-denial forces with 
tactically actionable targeting cues. Indeed, China’s and (to a much lesser extent) 
Iran’s deployments of dense, layered, and networked capabilities over the past 
decade represent continuity with the millennia-old struggles between offense 
and defense, as well as between localized area control and denial.
the JoaC specifically states that efforts to disable such networks in war re-
quire not only kinetic means but also deception 
and concealment. this is partly because the sur-
vivability and deterrence effect of forces deployed 
forward in a crisis depend in large part on their 
ability to avoid being targeted.2 It follows that 
because standing peacetime rules of engagement 
constrain prehostilities antinetwork measures, 
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force-level deception and concealment where practicable will be crucial to joint 
countersurveillance and countertargeting.3 
should deterrence fail, physical neutralization of maritime surveillance and 
reconnaissance sensors, communications pathways, and data-fusion centers 
would likely consume considerable resources and time.4 In the meantime, po-
litical objectives would likely assign forward maritime forces other tasks that 
necessarily expose them to the still-capable network.5 some network elements are 
likely to be shielded through hardening, mobility, or positioning beyond strike 
range. antinetwork operations may also face self-imposed political constraints 
stemming from escalation concerns. the network may additionally maintain a 
“war reserve” to replace neutralized assets and compromised pathways, though 
returns may diminish as a conflict’s duration increases. Nevertheless, the 1991 
gulf War campaign against Iraq’s integrated air-defense system suggests that the 
risks an adversary’s network poses would not decrease quickly and could never be 
completely eliminated via neutralization of nodes and pathways alone.6 
deception and concealment can help mitigate these risks—namely, that a 
network-empowered adversary might cripple U.s. forward maritime forces in a 
massive, war-opening strike; achieve in the first days or weeks some fait accompli 
that maritime forces are striving to prevent; or inflict severe losses on maritime 
forces as they maneuver within the contested zone to retake the initiative. de-
ception and concealment are hardly new to electronic-age maritime warfare, and 
although the tactics and historical examples that follow are hardly comprehen-
sive, they help outline potential countersurveillance and countertargeting tools.
deception and concealment alone cannot guarantee success; they are comple-
ments to, rather than substitutes for, robust kinetic weapon systems that physi-
cally attrite sensors, weapons, platforms, and network infrastructures. all the 
same, their absence would likely handicap U.s. forward maritime operations 
within emerging threat environments, which in turn would impact contempo-
rary conventional deterrence credibility.
MariTiMe concealMenT docTrine and BaSic TacTicS
U.s. joint doctrine defines “concealment” as “protection from observation or sur-
veillance.” Concealment is primarily a tactical-level effort that supports decep-
tion by “manipulating the appearance or obscuring the deceiver’s actual activi-
ties.”7 although some concealment tactics can be used effectively in the absence 
of deception (defined below), most attain peak effectiveness in tandem with it. In 
the JoaC framework, concealment falls under the term “stealth.”8 
the most commonly practiced maritime concealment tactic is emission con-
trol (eMCoN). Maritime forces typically restrict their radio-frequency (rf) 
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emissions and configure shipboard systems to limit acoustic emissions when 
operating in contested areas; platforms tasked with active sensor searches in 
support of forces in eMCoN are positioned so that the former’s emissions do 
not reveal the latter’s general location.9 as repeatedly demonstrated by the U.s. 
Navy against the soviet ocean surveillance system (soss) during the Cold War, 
eMCoN measures can severely constrain if not eliminate the usefulness of wide-
area passive sonar and rf direction-finding or electronic intelligence (elINt) 
sensors for surveillance and reconnaissance.10 eMCoN does not necessarily 
imply complete silence; highly directional line-of-sight communications systems 
and difficult-to-intercept “middleman” relays (satellites or aircraft) can provide 
critical command and coordination links. even so, it does represent a deep cut 
to the force’s normally available bandwidth. effective eMCoN therefore requires 
decentralized doctrine that embraces unit-level initiative in executing the force 
commander’s intentions, as well as preplanned and frequently practiced responses 
to foreseeable situations.11 
Force-level maneuver enables concealment as well. If the adversary’s maritime 
reconnaissance patterns and tactics, surveillance-satellite orbits, fixed-location 
sensor emplacements, and effective sensor coverages are known with reason-
able confidence, ocean transit plans can be designed to reduce the probability 
of detection or sustained tracking. for example, a force can maneuver to reduce 
electromagnetic and acoustic exposure.12 force-level maneuvers might also be 
ordered in response to long-range detection of adversary reconnaissance assets or 
seemingly neutral shipping or aircraft, changes in the adversary’s satellite disposi-
tions, or emergent tactical intelligence. 
additionally, a force’s operations can be adjusted to exploit meteorological 
phenomena.13 sufficiently dense haze and cloud cover reduces vulnerability to 
infrared (Ir) and visual-band electro-optical (eo) sensors. Precipitation simi-
larly reduces eo/Ir sensor effectiveness and, depending on wavelength and 
clutter-rejection capabilities, sometimes radar as well.14 atmospheric layering 
can cause radar emissions to be so refracted as to render nearby surface units 
and aircraft undetectable. Highly variable diurnal ionospheric conditions can 
likewise degrade shore-based over-the-horizon-backscatter (otH-b) radars. 
Heavy seas, however uncomfortable for crews, increase the background clutter 
otH-b radars must sift through, as well as the ambient noise that complicates 
passive sonar search.
In the absence of exploitable meteorological phenomena, surface units can 
lay obscurant “clouds” against eo/Ir sensors and millimeter-band radars, as 
well as chaff clouds against centimeter- and decimeter-band radars. throughout 
naval history, ships have employed similar methods to shield themselves from 
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detection, classification, identification, or precision tracking.15 obscurants and 
chaff are detectable, however; an adversary might reasonably assume that a unit 
of interest lies somewhere behind or beneath such a cloud and that closer re-
connaissance is warranted. the adversary may even directly target the cloud in 
hopes of temporarily incapacitating the concealed unit. obscurants and chaff are 
consequently best employed when supported by tactical deception.
Dispersion is another concealment tactic that works best within an overall de-
ception plan. Naval formations, for instance, are often thought of as like a bull’s-
eye, with rings of defensive aircraft and escorts surrounding high-campaign-
value surface units at the center.16 this is not always the case. Wide-area sea- and 
land-based sensors, long-range sea- and land-based weapons, and joint tactical 
data links allow a dispersed force to extend its sensor and weapons coverage over 
broad areas and its units to support each other even when not in physical prox-
imity. a dispersed force, therefore, may not be as conspicuous as a traditional 
formation to wide-area sensors. Combined with selective eMCoN and decep-
tive tactics, dispersion can allow a force to blend into background shipping.17 
the tyrannies of time, distance, speed, fuel, and electromagnetic/acoustic-wave 
propagation represent, however, an important caveat. as the Imperial Japanese 
Navy demonstrated at the battle of Midway, a force’s dispersion must never be 
so great that its units cannot quickly and effectively mass their capabilities or 
provide mutual support should deception fail.18
disciplined operational security (oPseC) and communications security 
(CoMseC) can be considered forms of concealment, as they deny information 
that could negate a deception plan. by restricting the personnel with knowledge 
of a planned action and minimizing related communications—encrypted where 
appropriate and sent only over the most secure and trusted pathways—a force 
can complicate an adversary’s intelligence collection.19 although CoMseC 
measures and cyberdefenses support pathway integrity and confidentiality, a 
force commander may use human couriers or other “out of band” methods to 
protect critical messages, despite impacts to throughput and timeliness.20 gener-
ally speaking, robust oPseC and CoMseC measures mean a force cannot use 
finely choreographed plans relying on “just-in-time” updates or direct control. 
like eMCoN, they compel reliance on “command by negation,” a doctrine that 
empowers unit commanders to exercise initiative to carry out the force com-
mander’s promulgated intentions. 
electronic warfare (eW) concealment comprises two main tactics. first, rf 
and acoustic systems can employ low-probability-of-intercept (lPI) hardware 
and waveforms that make them very difficult to detect, analyze, or exploit. an 
adversary may eventually extract lPI emissions from the ambient environment, 
though. lPI capability employment must hinge on risk analysis; certain critical 
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capabilities should be withheld as war reserve and even in combat used only 
when absolutely necessary.21 
electromagnetic jamming is the other major eW concealment tactic. rf noise 
can effectively saturate older or less sophisticated radar receivers, tax modern 
radar processing enough to make searching less efficient, and disrupt the com-
munication of a remote sensor or data-relay node with a network.22 low-power, 
solid-state Ir and visible-band lasers can be used to blind eo/Ir sensors, but 
because solid-state lasing mediums can excite photons only in narrow wave-
length blocks, multiple lasers may be necessary to blind a single multispectral 
or hyperspectral eo/Ir system.23 the greatest limitation of noise jamming is 
that an adversary can cross-fix the source of the jamming and cue scouts to 
search nearby for the supported force. this risk can be mitigated somewhat by 
positioning airborne jammers so as not to compromise the force’s location, or by 
employing deception.
lastly, “distributed denial of service” (ddos) and penetrative “disruption/
blinding” cyberattacks against nodes of a surveillance-reconnaissance-strike net-
work potentially contribute to maritime concealment. a ddos attack saturates 
a targeted web server with data requests in order to disrupt its hosted services 
and connectivity. However, an adversary can harden a network against ddos 
by using pathways with bandwidths well beyond that needed for most services; 
redundant war-reserve mirrored servers into which those under ddos bom-
bardment can “fail over”; war-reserve or “out-of-band” network pathways for 
rerouting; or agile Internet protocol (IP) address/domain blocking. It is also not 
clear how a sizable sustained ddos attack can be practicably directed against 
military networks that are not connected to the public Internet.
Whereas ddos attacks are “brute force,” penetrative cyberattacks that blind 
networked sensors, disrupt or corrupt network data-relay pathways, or shut 
down data-fusion infrastructures require a substantial level of tradecraft. some 
might involve “logic bombs” covertly inserted prior to a conflict and triggered 
by remote signal or insider action. others may involve real-time penetrations, 
again dependent on prior intelligence collection against, and exploration of, the 
adversary’s network. Much as with ddos, though, war-reserve network infra-
structures and sensors, as well as out-of-band communications pathways, may be 
able to limit the duration and impact of a penetrative “disruption and blinding” 
cyberattack.
this is not to say that these cyberattack types are unlikely to be useful in any 
scenario but to suggest that they may not be the most effective or viable means 
for nonkinetically handicapping an adversary’s networked systems—unless, at 
least, one knows with some confidence how severely and for how long they could 
degrade the adversary. 
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MariTiMe decePTion docTrine and BaSic TacTicS
Joint doctrine defines “military deception” as those “actions executed to delib-
erately mislead” adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, 
intentions, and operations, “thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions 
(or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.” 
an adversary’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance networks are the 
channels for conveying a deceptive “story” and are not themselves the deception 
targets. rather, deception is aimed at specific military or political leaders, with 
the objective of inducing them to make suboptimal decisions by exploiting their 
known or apparent preconceptions. It follows that operational deception is aimed 
at campaign/operational-level planners and decision makers, while tactical decep-
tion focuses on the engagement and battle levels.24 the boundaries separating op-
erational and tactical deception are increasingly blurry in practice, though, since 
an adversary’s theater-range maritime strike assets may be controlled by a com-
mander who bridges the two levels. operational deception may therefore be neces-
sary to induce surveillance-reconnaissance-strike asset retasking or repositioning 
within a theater that makes such assets less usable against a supported force. 
Maritime deception tactics are generally most effective when several are si-
multaneously employed so as to address all adversary sensing methods, as well 
as to establish and legitimize the deception story. deception is also generally 
coordinated with concealment tactics, as well as selective physical neutralization 
of surveillance and scouting assets.25 such coordination denies the adversary 
information that might reveal the charade while allowing the defender to collect 
disinformation reinforcing the story.
visual deception tactics include painting schemes and lighting configurations 
that make a ship appear from a distance to be of a different type or size. Prefab-
ricated structures and deceptive lighting can simulate austere forward operating 
bases or airstrips. less common is deceptive alteration of a ship’s structure; for 
example, in World War II, false stacks installed on allied tankers in Murmansk-
bound convoys prevented their easy identification by luftwaffe bomber crews, 
and the royal Navy reconfigured an obsolescent battleship to look like a newer 
one in order to lure bombers away from a 1942 Malta convoy. other visual decep-
tions merely imply the presence of a unit or group, such as the World War II–era 
“water snowflake” float, which launched an illumination rocket on a preset time 
delay at night to convince U-boats that a convoy lay just over the horizon.26 visual 
deceptive tactics are likely to be most effective when used against scouts who 
for safety limit the time they spend near a force, how close they will approach it, 
or what active-sensor usage they will risk in its proximity; austere scouts, such 
as those on civilian or commercial platforms, who lack advanced sensors; or 
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surveillance-reconnaissance systems that are prevented by natural or artificial 
phenomena from optimally using their sensors. 
Deceptive maneuver tactics include use of misleading routes to manipulate a 
force’s “attractiveness” for investigation or attack, or to mislead as to its actual 
objectives.27 as the U.s. Navy periodically demonstrated against the soss during 
the Cold War, decoy groups can draw reconnaissance-strike resources away from 
a main force in eMCoN.28 Units can additionally exploit an opponent’s tacti-
cal complacency to conceal their movements by taking advantage of the latter’s 
known transit routes and procedures.29 
Deceptive communications tactics involve the transmission of messages falsify-
ing identities, compositions, locations, intentions, activities, or states of readi-
ness. since an adversary probably cannot be expected to intercept, identify as 
significant, decrypt, and analyze a given message in a timely manner, deception 
tactics often attack the ability to perform traffic-pattern analysis.30 for example, 
the Imperial Japanese Navy employed several anti–pattern analysis tactics to 
conceal the Pearl Harbor striking force’s November–december 1941 transit to-
ward Pearl Harbor.31 alternatively, an adversary’s communications-intelligence 
apparatus can be saturated with “junk” transmissions or contradictory messages. 
a decoy unit can also simulate another unit’s communications while the latter is 
in eMCoN.32 forces can even attempt to penetrate an adversary’s communica-
tions channels and generate false messages that distract, confuse, or redirect his 
surveillance and reconnaissance.33
Deceptive ew and acoustics often involve equipping platforms, expendable 
decoys, or unmanned vehicles with systems that simulate another unit’s rf or 
acoustic signatures. the aim is to prevent the actual units from being detected, 
classified, identified, or tracked. during World War II, the allies periodically 
used chaff, radar-reflecting balloons and wire cages attached to floats, corner re-
flectors on small ships, and even false-target generators to convince enemy radars 
that a major naval force was operating in a given area, so as to attract attack at the 
wrong place or allow an actual force to break contact.34 Identification friend or 
foe (Iff) “spoofing” and deceptive jamming of targeting and weapons-guidance 
sensors are other deceptive eW tactics that debuted in that conflict.35 Post-1945 
technology developments added electronic “blip” enhancement, integrated 
simulation of rf and acoustic emissions, and expendable offboard decoy tech-
nologies.36 today, with sufficient intelligence regarding adversary radars’ designs 
and signal-processing techniques, deceptive eW systems can use such emerging 
technologies as “digital radiofrequency memory” for precision replication, rapid 
analysis, subtle modulation, and carefully timed directional retransmission of 
waveforms to trick adversary radars into “detecting” highly realistic contacts in 
empty space.37 
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lastly, cyberspace operations are a relatively recent addition to the decep-
tion portfolio. a commonly hypothesized “crown jewel” tactic uses intelligence 
collected about the gateways and computing infrastructure of an adversary 
surveillance-reconnaissance network to execute cyberattacks that manipulate the 
situational picture it provides decision makers. the technical challenges and un-
certainties of sustaining manipulative cyberattacks throughout a war are severe. 
for that reason, the most frequently used deceptive cyberspace operation may be 
the “computer network charade” (CNC), which indirectly supports countersur-
veillance by hijacking the adversary’s intelligence-collection activities.38
CNC takes advantage of the fact that timely fusion of intelligence into a situ-
ational picture is exceptionally difficult, even when aided by data mining and 
other analytical technologies, since a human generally has to assess each piece of 
“interesting” information. once counterintelligence reveals an adversary’s intel-
ligence exploitation activities within friendly forces’ networks, CNC can feed ma-
nipulative information tied to a deception story or worthless information meant 
to saturate. this can be done using the existing exploited network elements, 
or alternatively by introducing “honeypots.”39 Massive amounts of such faked 
material as documents, message traffic, e-mails, chat, or database interactions 
can be auto-generated and populated with unit identities, locations, times, and 
even human-looking errors. the material can be either randomized to augment 
concealment or pattern-formed to reinforce a deception story, as appropriate. a 
unit can similarly manipulate its network behavior to defeat traffic analysis, or 
augment the effectiveness of a decoy group by simulating other units or echelons. 
all this leaves the adversary the task of discriminating false content from any real 
items he might have collected.40 
regardless of CNC method, it can be determined whether or not planted 
disinformation has been captured by the adversary. the commonalities of CNC 
with many communication-deception tactics are not coincidental. In fact, civil-
ian mass media, social networks, and e-mail pathways can also be used as disin-
formation channels in support of forward forces.41 
THe adverSarY’S Firing deciSion
to understand how maritime deception and concealment tactics can be opti-
mally combined, it is important to understand how an adversary decides how 
many weapons to launch and how that number impacts an adversary’s campaign 
requirements. the salvo-sizing calculus is based on the probability that the firing 
platform will be destroyed or break down prior to weapons release; the prob-
ability the weapon itself will fail after launch; the size of the area the weapon’s 
guidance sensors must search for the designated target, as compared to their 
fields of view; the probability that the weapon will detect and lock onto the target; 
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the probability that it will be able to penetrate anticipated defenses; and the esti-
mated number of weapons that must hit to inflict a desired amount of damage. 
the lower the cumulative probability of a single weapon’s success and the more 
of them needed to strike the target to inflict the desired damage, the higher the 
number of weapons that must be fired per salvo. 
a firing decision can therefore represent a hefty opportunity cost to the attack-
er, as the weapons inventory must be managed against requirements needed for 
the duration of the campaign and as coercive “bargaining chips” for the political- 
diplomatic endgame. It follows that the more complex a weapon or the more lim-
ited the resources the attacker can allocate to its production, the longer its users 
must wait for replacements. In a prolonged conflict, the effect is magnified if the 
defender can restore damaged units’ most operationally important capabilities 
faster than the attacker can replenish weapons. all of this means that it may not 
matter whether cost differentials allow the attacker to procure several times as 
many offensive weapons as the defender has ships, aircraft, or land-based sites. It 
also may not matter that the number of offensive weapons available significantly 
exceeds the number of targets in track. as with all decisions involving a scarcity, 
the central metric would seem to be the prospective attacker’s self-estimated 
campaign-level opportunity cost of striking at a given point in time. 
a prospective attacker might deal with this problem by devoting the major-
ity of the most capable weapons to a conflict’s earliest phases, perhaps includ-
ing a first strike. It is then that an attacker holds the maximum advantage, as 
its surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are not yet heavily degraded by 
countermeasures and counterattacks. the prospective attacker who believes a 
conflict will be short might be tempted to expend the inventory quickly, given 
that chances for using it most effectively will decrease rapidly. the campaign-
level opportunity cost of classifying targets “by debris” might well be low under 
these circumstances. 
a defender can exploit this situation by sacrificing lower-campaign-value assets 
to a first strike and its immediate aftermath, and can also attempt to deceive the 
attacker into wasting inventory against decoys while the defender conceals higher- 
campaign-value assets.42 this approach has the bonus of enabling early data col-
lection and analysis against the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance-strike 
architecture under combat conditions to identify quickly exploitable vulnerabili-
ties that were not discoverable during peacetime.43
However, if the attacker requires that a given weapon be employable through-
out a prolonged conflict and that a certain number be preserved for the end-
game, the inventory must be either relatively large, quickly replenishable, or used 
economically.44 Under these circumstances, an attacker might hesitate to expend 
a significant portion of the inventory in a given raid if uncertain which—if 
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any—targets are valid, especially in the aftermath of a successful deception.45 
It is instructive that throughout the Cold War the vaunted soviet maritime 
“reconnaissance-strike complex,” notwithstanding its wide-area land, sea, air, 
and space sensors for over-the-horizon missile targeting, was forced by U.s. Navy 
deception and concealment to depend consistently on visual-range scouts for 
positive target identification.46 the physics of contemporary sensor capabilities 
and limitations does not suggest that the near future will be any different. 
as a result, the more a defender can confuse an inventory-husbanding pro-
spective attacker’s situational picture by making it impossible to tell from a dis-
tance whether a given contact is what it appears to be or whether high-confidence 
targets in track are actually the most important ones to attack, the more likely 
that the attacker will hesitate to strike. In fact, the more the defender can tax the 
adversary’s surveillance and reconnaissance resources through physical attrition, 
deception, and concealment, the better the chances that high-campaign-value 
forces will escape attention, unless and until their missions compel them to drop 
cover.47 
With this appreciation, we can now outline how deception and concealment 
can help a force survive a first strike with minimal degradation and then quickly 
rally to slow down, if not defeat, the follow-on offensive. though these two tasks 
contain significant tactical similarities, the vast difference in their strategic cir-
cumstances means that the first task is far more challenging than the second. the 
application of doctrine and tactics to form practicable deception and conceal-
ment concepts becomes somewhat different for the two tasks. 
BlUnTing FirST STrikeS and SalvoS
the defender’s tactical deception and concealment prior to a first strike, or naval 
domain “first salvo,” aim to prevent or delay effective targeting of forward forces 
and high-campaign-value units. should an attack be delivered, the role of decep-
tion and concealment is to draw inbound weapons away from actual units.
the success of a first strike generally hinges on an attacker’s own use of de-
ception and concealment to enhance surprise.48 a defender therefore cannot 
be certain of detecting and recognizing strategic warnings of imminent war, let 
alone tactical warnings of imminent attack, with enough confidence and rapidity 
to implement optimal countersurveillance and countertargeting measures. In any 
case, indication and warning (I&W) is rarely unambiguous. even should I&W 
be accepted and hedging actions directed by the leadership, political and psycho-
logical factors are likely so to handicap the response that forward forces will not 
be able to employ fully their deception and concealment options.49 
the defender’s political objectives during a crisis may further complicate the 
problem, as exemplified by U.s. sixth fleet’s operations during the 1973 yom 
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Kippur War. by presidential direction, the sixth fleet was to maintain forward 
presence at the war zone’s immediate periphery; support the transoceanic, air-
borne, logistical replenishment of Israel; and deter soviet naval intervention. 
these tasks meant that the sixth fleet could not use space and maneuver to com-
plicate soviet targeting, and the confined geography of the eastern Mediterranean 
only worsened the dilemma. “tattletale” scouts provided the soviet 5th eskadra 
with high-confidence over-the-horizon missile-targeting data by taking station 
within close visual range of the highest-campaign-value U.s. combatants.50 With 
his concealment and deception options foreclosed, the commander of the sixth 
fleet would have faced an unenviable choice had he received possible I&W of a 
soviet first salvo: either exercise his authority under american rules of engage-
ment to unleash his own first salvo against the 5th eskadra and thereby initiate 
a superpower conflict, with all its associated escalation hazards, or risk his war-
ships by holding back in hope that a risk-averse Kremlin did not want to chance 
a soviet-american war.51 
the yom Kippur case illustrates the tactical difficulties of prolonged opera-
tions within a confined maritime space during a crisis. When geography so great-
ly simplifies the search problem, a force might be able to avoid localization and 
identification for hours at best, even if it maximally employs such basic conceal-
ment tactics as eMCoN. It follows that the proximity of scouts to a force makes 
the use of jamming or decoys for countersurveillance and countertargeting 
unsustainable; it might compromise “tricks” prematurely and with little benefit. 
Jamming might even be unnecessarily provocative, depending on the situation. 
Postlaunch concealment, however, may still be highly effective against inbound 
weapons at low relative cost in resources and mission impact.52 With adequate 
intelligence, or at least correct assumptions about weapon guidance, postlaunch 
eW or acoustic deception may likewise help limit the number of successful hits to 
a campaign-tolerable level. as will be discussed later, a potential adversary’s un-
certainties regarding a defender’s deception and concealment capabilities against 
an inbound first strike may reinforce deterrence.
the less confined a crisis’s maritime space, however, the more deception and 
concealment can be tactically effective as well as useful for deterrence. this is es-
pecially so if the most vulnerable campaign-valuable elements of a conventional 
deterrent are positioned outside optimal first-strike range, yet close enough to 
rapidly blunt the adversary’s offensive actions and prevent a fait accompli.53 for 
example, when at least two aircraft carriers are present in a theater, one should 
almost always be under way and able to become quickly unlocatable, even in 
peacetime. If both carriers must be simultaneously in port during a period of ten-
sion, one of those ports should either be outside the optimal first-strike range or 
in a country that the potential adversary would be reluctant to drag into conflict. 
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these posture adjustments must be made in consultation between the defender 
and his forward allies, and they ought to be made in peacetime vice during a crisis 
to mitigate the risk of misperceptions.54
shifting high-campaign-value units beyond a potential adversary’s optimal 
first-strike range is operationally plausible, because initial forward denial opera-
tions against a maritime offensive can be waged by submarines; relatively numer-
ous lower-campaign-value warships with offensive armaments disproportionate 
to their size; land-based air and missile defenses, as well as antiship missiles on 
friendly-held forward territories and choke points; sea-based missile defenses 
protecting forward bases and positions; preinserted forward, territorial-defense 
ground forces; and widespread offensive and defensive mining.55 these forces can 
be supported by maritime-denial and logistical aircraft operating from dispersed 
forward land bases, distant land bases, or over-the-horizon aircraft carriers. 
In contrast, the main operational roles of carrier and expeditionary groups 
following a first strike would arguably be to temporarily secure highly localized 
areas—that is, achieve “moving bubble” sea control—to support mass movement 
of reinforcements and matériel into and perhaps within the theater, protect pri-
mary economic lines of communication, and maintain sea bases for projecting 
maritime denial into areas the adversary seeks to control. In many scenarios, 
these missions would require carrier and expeditionary groups to operate at least 
initially from the contested zone’s periphery.56 raids by these groups within the 
contested zone may also be desirable.57 
given these assumptions, carrier and expeditionary groups could mitigate 
their first-strike vulnerability as a crisis escalates by taking advantage of wide 
maneuver space to employ such concealment tactics as eMCoN, dispersal, 
weather masking, artificial obscuration, or evasion. these groups could simi-
larly use deceptive visual, maneuver, communications, and CNC tactics to cre-
ate countersurveillance and countertargeting ruses—decoy units or groups, for 
example.58 they might also be able to employ certain eW or cyberattack tactics, 
as allowed within the rules of engagement and as balanced against the likelihood 
of revealing exploitation methods and perceived exploitable vulnerabilities, and 
given relative spatial separation from the potential adversary’s sensors and firing 
platforms. 
even if not in geographically confined waters, though, forward surface forces 
“locked” to a geographic position or required to operate overtly during a crisis 
would almost certainly not be able to take advantage of pre–first salvo conceal-
ment and deception tactics. It follows that combatants executing such missions 
as sea-based air and missile defense in support of forward forces would be highly 
exposed.59 forward land-based sensors and weapons, however, might be able to 
compensate for their constrained tactical mobility through rotational dispersion 
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among austere basing sites, minimized or deceptive communications and emis-
sions, CNC, and countertargeting displays (signature-simulating decoy aircraft 
and equipment).60 
a defender might support frontline forces by trying to saturate the adversary’s 
maritime targeting picture from the start of a crisis. It is not clear, though, that 
such an effort would be practicable, let alone sustainable. this degree of decep-
tion might require revealing crown-jewel eW and cyberattack tactics along with 
vulnerability exploits, which would be worthwhile only if the potential crisis-
stabilizing benefits outweighed the probable tactical costs. 
Nevertheless, forward forces have some cause for optimism. although pre–
first strike rules of engagement would likely bar direct neutralization of potential 
adversary manned reconnaissance assets, the same might not be true regarding 
unmanned ones. there are recent historical precedents of one state neutralizing 
another’s unescorted, unmanned scouts during times of elevated tension without 
inciting much more than diplomatic protests.61 far less stigma attaches to killing 
robots than manned platforms. a defender might declare exclusion areas dur-
ing a crisis within which any detected unmanned system would be neutralized; 
enforcement of these areas might well not precipitate drastic escalation by the 
other side.62 this possibility should be examined further through war gaming, as 
well as by historical case studies of the use of assertive peacetime Cold War and 
post–Cold War–era antiscouting tactics, such as shouldering, communications 
jamming, and physical attack.63 If the findings are favorable in terms of escalatory 
risks and the resulting legitimization of the same against american unmanned 
systems during crises is tolerable, it may be worthwhile for the United states to 
advance unmanned scout neutralization diplomatically as a norm. 
PoST–FirST STrike/Salvo oPeraTionS 
a defender’s most immediate uses of deception and concealment after absorb-
ing a first strike are to prevent, or reduce the effectiveness of, follow-on strikes 
against forward forces as they reconstitute and then begin their direct resistance. 
the tactics used are much the same as before the first strike, but their potential 
effectiveness is amplified by the fact that the defender can now physically neutral-
ize manned scouts and aggressively deceive, if not selectively neutralize, elements 
of the adversary’s maritime surveillance-reconnaissance network. 
However, a defender’s political objectives will often deny the luxury of waiting 
for decisive neutralization of the adversary network’s capabilities before commit-
ting higher-campaign-value forces within the contested zone. Indeed, political 
direction may compel extremely risky operations, in which forward forces will 
have to rely heavily on tactical concealment and deception for self-protection. 
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for example, during the yom Kippur War the Israeli navy was tasked with 
removing the syrian and egyptian fast-attack-craft threat to coastal commerce, 
even though the Israelis’ gabriel Mark 1 antiship missile could reach only half as 
far as their opponents’ soviet-supplied ss-N-2 styx. Worse, Israeli fast attack craft 
lacked robust active antiship-missile-defense capabilities. the Israeli navy’s main 
defenses at the time were chaff and shipboard eW jammers whose specifications 
reportedly owed more to educated guesses than the limited technical intelligence 
available. Israeli eW systems were therefore designed to employ multiple tricks, 
in hopes that at least one would prove effective. the design assumptions were 
vindicated during the yom Kippur naval battles of latakia and baltim, where the 
Israeli eW lured the syrian and egyptian craft into depleting their styx inven-
tories, which in turn allowed the Israeli craft to close within gabriel range and 
devastate their opponents.64 
a defender may not always be this fortunate in countermeasure-design as-
sumptions and yet be no less pressed to operate deep within an adversary’s op-
timal attack range. the fact that there was little confidence the U.s. Navy’s first-
generation noise jammers could counter german radio-guided antiship bombs, 
after all, was not allowed to hold up the september 1943 salerno landings.65 this 
possibility highlights the importance of planning “branching” (alternative) ac-
tions, and perhaps also of using, as politically and operationally possible, assets 
for which losses could be tolerated, to mitigate the impact of failed deception or 
concealment. 
the relaxation of the rules of engagement after a first strike also opens the 
door to using deception and concealment to distract an adversary from the de-
fender’s subsequent actions, mislead the adversary as to the defender’s intentions, 
or seduce him into wasting scarce resources investigating or attacking decoys. 
this is especially promising if the adversary’s decision makers are doctrinally 
dogmatic; overconfident in their surveillance-reconnaissance-strike capabilities, 
tactics, and plans; or driven to attack by ideology or fear. signature-simulating 
decoy aircraft, vehicles, and equipment can be dispersed to forward land bases, 
which, when supported by deceptive communications and CNC, may be able to 
attract attention or attack. likewise, as demonstrated by the U.s. sCatHe MeaN 
mission during the 1991 gulf War, unmanned aerial vehicles or gliding expend-
able decoys can simulate aircraft in action.66 Unmanned subsurface vehicles 
could similarly be used to simulate submarines in order to confuse antisubmarine 
forces, if not lure them out of position or into wasteful prosecutions. 
on the ocean surface, as previously discussed U.s. Navy Cold War–era ex-
amples show, it is entirely feasible to surround a ship that is visually and elec-
tronically simulating a high-campaign-value unit with actual escorts or aircraft to 
create a decoy group. a defender may also use signature-emulation technologies 
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installed in low-campaign-value warships, aircraft, or unmanned systems to form 
a decoy group.67 decoy groups can be positioned in a distant part of a theater to 
divert attention or attract attack, or they can steam ahead of actual groups to con-
fuse the situational picture, induce the adversary to commit forces prematurely, 
or lure those forces into an ambush. 
decoy groups are more likely to succeed early in a conflict if the defender has 
convinced the opponent in peacetime that a certain operational sequence would 
be followed during hostilities. for instance, although the conditioning effort was 
not preplanned, decades of operational observations led U.s. Navy commanders, 
planners, and intelligence analysts to expect the Imperial Japanese Navy to wait 
in home waters for the U.s. Pacific fleet’s sortie toward east asia in event of war. 
by placing decoy units near Japanese homeports to cover the striking force’s 
transit, the Imperial Japanese Navy exploited american expectations to great ef-
fect.68 similarly, if during peacetime exercises a defender has routinely moved a 
particular unit type or group forward—perhaps even to specific areas—shortly 
after the “outbreak of hostilities” to perform missions consistent with publicly 
articulated strategy or doctrine, the attacker might well expect the defender to do 
the same in an actual conflict. decoy forces fitting that pattern, supported by ef-
forts to blind or roll back surveillance and reconnaissance coverage, may be very 
effective—especially if they play directly to the adversary’s own preconceptions 
and doctrinal preferences.
other forms of deception and concealment that might be used early in a 
conflict rely on misleading the adversary’s decision makers as to operational 
or tactical intentions and priorities. In a feint, deliberate contact with an adver-
sary’s forces is made to deceive their commanders as to the timing, location, or 
importance of the separate, actual main offensive action.69 for example, during 
operation HUsKy, the allied invasion of sicily, in July 1943, U.s. Navy “beach 
Jumpers” used fast boats armed with barrage rockets and equipped with noise-
makers that acoustically simulated landing craft and infantry firefights, smoke-
laying gear, and eW systems to conduct feint landing attempts in the western part 
of the island. these feints resulted in german reserves being withheld from the 
actual beachhead in southern sicily. two months later, the beach Jumpers seized 
islands in the gulf of Naples to confuse the germans as to the planned landing 
beach site for operation avalaNCHe, once again producing german hesitation 
to commit reserves—this time at salerno.70 In contrast, an attempt to entice an 
opponent, by a “show of force” but without direct contact, into actions favorable 
to oneself is a demonstration.71 during the first gulf War, the presence of a U.s. 
Navy amphibious task force in the northern arabian gulf, for instance, served 
as a demonstration that induced Iraqi misallocation of major forces to guarding 
Kuwait’s coast rather than its land border.72 
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None of these deceptions was in itself of decisive importance to the success of 
the operations they supported, but all reduced the opposition with which friendly 
forces had to cope at critical stages. Indeed, well-conceived feints and demon-
strations before a main action can induce an adversary to divert surveillance, 
reconnaissance, or strike resources from positions where they could have been 
employed against the main force. afterward, feints and demonstrations may be 
used to distract attention from follow-on maneuvers as well as to cause confusion 
as to the friendly force’s actual objectives. 
feints and demonstrations generally require the use of actual combatant 
forces, as opposed to artificial decoys, though the former have historically often 
been augmented by the latter to achieve desired effects. a deception story might 
require that certain actions be actually performed rather than simulated, and 
stand-alone artificial decoys may be unable to keep the adversary deceived for 
the length of time desired. the visible use of actual forces may also provide a 
hesitant adversary a “certainty” that will lead to the distraction of attention and 
misallocation of resources. 
Maritime feints and demonstrations might involve actual strikes or localized 
control/denial operations by submarines or aircraft, threatening movements by 
naval surface forces, amphibious raids, or simulated amphibious or airborne 
force insertions, all with the intention of distracting the adversary or drawing 
combat resources away from a main action. “Cyberfeints” against elements of an 
adversary’s maritime surveillance-reconnaissance-strike network—or perhaps 
some other network—could even be performed to divert attention and defense 
resources from cyberspace operations elsewhere, or distract attention from real-
world tactical actions. 
feints and demonstrations must not reduce one’s own available combat power 
below what is necessary for high-confidence execution of a main action. feint 
and demonstration groups will generally employ concealment, ruses, or displays 
to attract attention at particular times and places but otherwise to cloak their 
movements and dispositions. Communications deception and CNC may be used 
to make the feint or demonstration appear to be the main action. specially con-
structed feints and demonstrations may also play to the JoaC’s emphasis on seiz-
ing the initiative by deploying and operating along multiple, independent lines.73 
some feints or demonstrations could even conceivably be designed to achieve 
campaign-level objectives, such as disrupting and wearing down expeditionary 
or maritime denial forces, reducing confidence in the adversary’s surveillance-
reconnaissance tactics and network, or seizing peripheral territories useful for 
forward bases.74 However, feints and demonstrations using sizable forces or units 
of medium or high campaign value might not be viable at acceptable risk until 
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss4/7
 s o l o M o N  1 0 3
the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance capabilities are sufficiently degraded 
or long-range maritime strike arsenals depleted.
Notwithstanding all this, a maritime force must eventually break cover to 
execute its missions—land-attack strikes, amphibious operations, air and missile 
defense in support of bases and allied territories, or sea control or denial. Contin-
ued deception and concealment for countersurveillance become difficult at this 
stage. Nonetheless, some forms of countertargeting deception—such as use of de-
coy units and groups, artificial decoys, or obscurants—might retain effectiveness, 
depending on the mission and the threat environment.75 once the time comes 
for maritime forces to break contact with the adversary and relocate or withdraw, 
joint and combined forces’ support in the form of feints, demonstrations, or 
ruses, as well as nonkinetic disruption and physical neutralization of the adver-
sary’s surveillance-reconnaissance network assets, would likely prove invaluable.
inTelligence, Training, organiZaTional, and Planning 
PrereqUiSiTeS 
None of the deception and concealment tactics discussed thus far will work 
absent groundwork begun many years in advance, of which intelligence and 
counterintelligence preparation is perhaps the most painstaking part. deception 
planners must identify the intelligence-collection points of potential adversaries 
and learn what stimuli are necessary to elicit desired reactions.76 they also need 
to understand potential adversaries’ surveillance and reconnaissance doctrine 
and tactics, sensor designs and capabilities, sensor network architecture (includ-
ing data transmission and fusion), and counterdeception measures. Perhaps most 
critically, deception planners need to identify maritime operational and tactical 
leaders of likely opponents and learn as much as possible about their decision-
making processes and tendencies.77 
While some of this information can be collected via clandestine means, much 
of it depends on repeated, systematically orchestrated operational exposure to 
the surveillance-reconnaissance networks of potential adversaries. routine mari-
time exercises can be tailored to elicit surveillance, reconnaissance, and force-
posturing responses. these exercises can also be designed to shape perceptions 
of friendly forces’ doctrine, capabilities, likely wartime campaign priorities, and 
decision making. Perception shaping is especially important because, as we have 
seen, the credibility of deception stories in combat increases if an adversary’s de-
cision makers have been conditioned in peacetime to anticipate certain behaviors 
by the defender. 
Potential adversaries might restrain their responses to exercises to withhold 
useful information, or could conceivably tailor responses as deceptions of their 
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own. their observed behavior during exercises—as well as their own exercises—
can be correlated with other sources to find the probable “ground truth.” Military 
decision makers are often quite frank in their professional journals and military-
academic studies about their forces’ shortcomings and needed doctrinal, tactical, 
or technological changes. open-source writings also provide a window into the 
thought processes and mentalities of their authors, which is especially useful 
should those authors be, or eventually become, key decision makers. Counter-
intelligence on the potential adversary’s own collection priorities provides addi-
tional data points. systematic human-in-the-loop war gaming based on what is 
confidently known about possible opponents’ objectives, doctrine, and weapons 
inventories may also be useful in building or checking potentially actionable as-
sumptions about their “shoot/no-shoot” criteria in prewar and wartime circum-
stances.78 over time, all these sources and methods help in formulating, testing, 
and evaluating hypotheses regarding adversary capabilities and behaviors relative 
to various stimuli.
Intelligence and counterintelligence additionally provide feedback regarding 
the effectiveness of a deception in progress.79 since doctrine and operational 
plans cannot depend on deep and reliable intelligence penetration of the adver-
sary, wartime intelligence feedback may come mostly from the actions of the 
target of a deception. for instance, a key indicator of success might be that the 
adversary is focusing surveillance and reconnaissance resources or massing strike 
assets in ways that appear driven by the deception story. a decrease in adversary 
data exfiltration efforts from a given network following friendly-force CNC op-
erations might suggest that the adversary is losing confidence in the network’s 
usefulness for intelligence exploitation. feints and minor operations can also be 
conducted during a conflict to observe and analyze responses, as a precursor of 
major initiatives.
another method for assessing the effectiveness of deception and conceal-
ment is the “red team.” Intelligence cells not privy to a friendly force’s plans can 
be tasked with deducing that force’s location, composition, and intentions using 
only tools, tactics, and techniques either possessed by or within the capabilities 
of adversary intelligence. If the red team is able to penetrate the friendly force’s 
deception and concealment, the planned action can be postponed and rede-
signed or otherwise replaced by a branching action.80 Indeed, planned branches 
are particularly critical against contingencies in which the adversary over-
comes the friendly force’s deception and concealment or successfully employs 
counterdeception. 
friendly forces must therefore be trained, equipped, and supported to mini-
mize their losses if they must fight their way out should deception or conceal-
ment fail. operational and tactical decision makers must weigh the risk of failure 
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against the immediate need to accomplish a given mission. If the mission’s 
operational-strategic need is great enough, the risk of major losses if deception 
and concealment are ineffective might be accepted. If not, the mission might be 
deferred until the probability of success at tolerable risk, with or without effective 
deception and concealment, increases. 
In any case, deception planning in a theater should be centrally coordinated 
to ensure that localized deception in support of a given operation or tactical ac-
tion does not conflict with or compromise others.81 deception must be firmly 
integrated within and subordinated to the force-level commander’s overall plan 
of action. Commanders must ensure that all units or groups under their control 
understand their roles in a deception so that inadvertent or independent actions 
do not gradually undermine it. this is difficult enough to accomplish within a 
single-service organization, such as a carrier group; the addition of other services 
or allied forces compounds the challenge. regular peacetime exercises are the 
best venues for working out these issues; it may not be possible to do so effec-
tively in the heat of crisis. the deception plan itself must be flexible enough that 
necessary measures or inadvertent incidents that break the cover can be made 
to appear consistent with the story. above all, the story must be plausible with 
respect to the existing situation, consistent with the prior shaping of expectations 
and perceptions, and tailored to exploit the opponent’s apparent processes and 
inclinations.82 
deception and concealment concepts must be aggressively tested in the con-
text of force-level doctrine and tactics. for instance, subtle differences in decoy 
positioning relative to main forces and defended units might mean failure.83 
Modeling and simulation, with and without humans in the loop, should be used 
for preliminary concept testing. thereafter, however, battle experiments con-
ducted during training exercises are critical for validation.84
It follows that forces must be thoroughly trained for performing deception and 
concealment while executing operations and tactical actions. deception and con-
cealment plans may require consumption of fuel and stores at a higher rate than 
would otherwise be the case, and the logistical challenges that may arise must be 
appreciated. In addition, friendly forces must be capable of executing deception 
and concealment safely despite the constraints they place on communications 
and active sensors. Personnel safety, not to mention that of ships and aircraft, 
depends on crew familiarity with operating in restrictive eMCoN and intense 
cyber-electronic-warfare environments.85 Increasing unit-level initiative in keep-
ing with a commander’s promulgated intentions will be a particularly critical 
training objective. this emphasis may require the focused advocacy of senior 
leadership, given the ways it runs contrary to certain network-centric warfare 
practices of the past two decades.86 
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some doctrinal elements or tactics that are considered war-critical, as well as 
tactical situations too complex to generate in forward theaters, can be practiced 
in home operating areas. In-port synthetic training can also be used for these 
purposes; it has the added benefits of enabling more frequent and intensive train-
ing than may be possible at sea, given how budgetary constraints are increasingly 
curtailing exercises of nondeployed forces. that said, aggressive peacetime train-
ing at sea remains necessary to provide the environmental variability and op-
erational risks necessary for building proficiency in deception and concealment. 
High-confidence intelligence, advanced technologies, and a clever deception 
plan may be all for naught if a force’s personnel lack the conditioning to execute 
the plan safely and reliably.
“training like you’d fight” and efforts to condition a potential adversary’s 
perceptions during peacetime are not necessarily incompatible. an exercise’s 
primary purpose is to increase proficiency in executing doctrine and tactics. as 
noted earlier, however, this does not mean that exercise scenarios must closely 
mirror actual campaign plans. It bears repeating that if forward exercises and 
authoritative public expressions of strategy and doctrine create an impression 
that the United states and its allies would follow a certain operational sequence 
in a given contingency, a potential adversary might be conditioned to believe that 
it reflects the actual contingency plan. None of this would degrade the ability of 
exercise forces to train to their doctrinal and tactical objectives.
concealMenT, decePTion, and deTerrence
exercises designed to shape perceptions can serve an additional purpose— 
reinforcing deterrence. If risk-averse prospective aggressors can be convinced 
by peacetime demonstrations of selected deception and concealment capabili-
ties that their chances of detecting and identifying forces are low or extremely 
uncertain, and their opportunity costs of wasting advanced weapons are high, 
they may estimate that their prospects for a decisive first strike are insufficiently 
promising. even if these prospective aggressors believe an opening attack might 
land strategically exploitable tactical blows, they may still be deterred if brought 
to conclude that the surviving defenders, now freed of prior restrictions on physi-
cal and cyber-electronic responses, would retain a fair chance of preventing the 
offensive from achieving its political objectives. 
there is precedent in modern american military history for maritime dem-
onstrations along these lines. as we have seen, the U.s. Navy selectively dem-
onstrated deception and concealment capabilities throughout the Cold War as 
a means of lessening the confidence of soviet leaders in the soss while simult-
aneously eliciting observable political and military reactions. during the first 
half of the 1980s in particular, the Navy wove these demonstrations into exercises 
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along the periphery of the soviet Union as part of a joint psychological campaign 
supporting specific grand-strategic objectives, along with military intelligence 
collection.87 these exercises were also likely designed to “normalize” U.s. use of 
deception and concealment, as to reduce the risk that their employment during 
heightened tensions might be misperceived as signaling hostile intent, as well as 
to shape soviet expectations regarding U.s. maritime doctrine, campaign priori-
ties, and strategy for a Nato–Warsaw Pact conflict. the exercises were certainly 
successful from the american perspective in terms of the intelligence collected, 
and eventual declassification of archival materials will reveal how they were 
viewed by both sides in terms of deterrence and conditioning.88 
a deterrence-reinforcing psychological campaign of that scope and scale is 
neither necessary nor desirable against China today, though an appropriately 
scaled campaign aimed at deterring Iranian conventional aggression might be, 
as the impasse over tehran’s nuclear program continues to fester. Neverthe-
less, routine exercises in the western Pacific, conducted within view of China’s 
nascent ocean-surveillance system, should periodically include psychological 
conditioning elements configured to shape expectations, as well as concealment 
and deception tactics selected to buttress the conventional deterrence credibility 
of U.s. maritime forces. visible commitment to training the joint force in the 
practice of maritime concealment and deception, selectively publicized acquisi-
tion of related technologies, and judicious demonstration of those tactics and 
technologies may, in coordination with grand-strategic initiatives featuring other 
elements of U.s. and allied power, go a long way toward enhancing conventional 
deterrence. should deterrence fail, though, these same measures would likely 
prove invaluable in having shaped an operational theater during peacetime in 
a way that promoted access in war—perhaps the most important precept of the 
Joint operational access concept.89
n o T e S 
 1. U.s. Joint staff, Joint operational access con-
cept, version 1.0 (Washington, d.C.: 17 Janu-
ary 2012) [hereafter Joint operational access 
concept], pp. 3–4. as a terminology note, this 
article defines “maritime control” and “mari-
time denial” by expanding on Julian Corbett’s 
definitions of “sea control” and “sea denial.” 
Corbett asserts that navies can never control 
the entirety of a sea at all times. Instead, he 
argues, navies strive to obtain and exercise 
temporary control of localized sea areas for 
given purposes or otherwise strive to prevent 
opponents from obtaining and exercising 
temporary localized sea control. the same is 
arguably true about military activities in the 
air and on land. since a force can use any one 
of these domains to support localized control 
in any of the other domains and can likewise 
use any of these domains to prevent or con-
test an adversary’s localized control in any of 
the other domains, new Corbettian terminol-
ogy is needed that accounts for these interac-
tions. given that a maritime area combines 
the sea with the airspace and “landspace” that 
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can affect or be affected by an actor’s use of 
the sea, “maritime control” means that a force 
(whether single-service, joint, or combined) 
has obtained and is exercising control of a 
localized maritime area for a certain duration 
and purpose; “maritime denial” means that a 
force is challenging an opposing force’s efforts 
to obtain and exercise control of a localized 
maritime area. 
 2. Ibid., pp. 2, 22–23, 25–26, 30–31.
 3. the term “force level” describes the doctrine, 
tactics, capabilities, operating concepts, and 
other considerations applicable to operating 
a maritime single-service, joint, or combined 
task force or group as an integrated whole.
 4. Wide-area surveillance sensors and mobile, 
highly sensitive reconnaissance sensors are 
arguably the most lucrative targets in an anti-
network campaign, as they cannot be repaired 
or replaced quickly or cheaply. Conversely, it 
is neither expensive nor time consuming in 
relative terms to replace damaged network 
computing infrastructure or shift to backup 
command sites. the only tactically meaning-
ful cost imposed by physical attacks against 
computing infrastructure may be the adver-
sary network’s temporary (albeit graceful, if 
the network is well designed) degradation, 
which friendly forces can certainly exploit 
operationally or tactically while it lasts. 
 5. for examples of these tasks in the context 
of notional conflicts with China or Iran, see 
Mark gunzinger, with Chris dougherty, 
outside-in: operating from range to Defeat 
iran’s anti-access and area-Denial Threats 
(Washington, d.C.: Center for strategic and 
budgetary assessments, January 2012), pp. 
53–73; Jan van tol [Capt., UsN (ret.)] et al., 
airSea Battle: a Point of Departure opera-
tional concept (Washington, d.C.: Center for 
strategic and budgetary assessments, May 
2010), pp. 56, 60, 74, 76, 117; and Jonathan f. 
solomon, “defending the fleet from China’s 
anti-ship ballistic Missile: Naval deception’s 
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able to sever Kari’s communications pathways 
fully, and the Iraqis were apparently even 
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r. gordon and bernard e. trainor [lt. gen., 
UsMC (ret.)], The general’s war (boston: 
back bay books, 1995), pp. 256–57. 
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solomon, “defending the fleet from China’s 
anti-ship ballistic Missile,” p. 61. 
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tion of operational surprise proved incor-
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to augment the 1st air fleet’s screening and 
scouting resources with the fast destroyers 
and floatplane-equipped cruisers meant even-
tually to provide fire support to the Midway 
landing force. by rendering the majority of 
his fleet incapable of supporting his highest-
campaign-value warships, yamamoto ensured 
that the resulting exchange would be isolated 
to the opposing and fairly closely matched 
carrier forces. see Jonathan Parshall and 
anthony tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold 
Story of the Battle of Midway (Washington, 
d.C.: Potomac books, 2005), pp. 50, 53–56.
 19. Milan N. vego, “operational deception in the 
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30 (spring 2002), pp. 60–66. as an example, 
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december 1941 transit to the Hawaiian 
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W. Prange, at Dawn we Slept: The Untold 
Story of Pearl Harbor (New york: Mcgraw-
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oPseC and CoMseC. see angevine, “Hid-
ing in Plain sight,” p. 89, and vistica, Fall 
from glory, p. 108. 
 21. for an outstanding technical overview of 
rf lPI, including theoretical lPI coun-
termeasure technologies and techniques, 
see aytug denk [Capt., turkish air force], 
“detection and Jamming low Probability 
of Intercept (lPI) radars” (master’s thesis, 
U.s. Naval Postgraduate school, september 
2006). It seems doubtful that lPI systems can 
avoid resort to restrictive eMCoN within a 
contested area for the duration of a conflict. 
While a highly directional line-of-sight rf 
communications system might employ lPI 
capabilities actively with acceptable risk, as 
that beam is very difficult to intercept, the 
same would not be true of a search radar. lPI 
seems to hold more promise as a means for 
expanding transmissions under certain risk-
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and space-based surveillance sensors from 
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throughput of their communications, or forc-
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benefit a defended force. In fact, co-orbital 
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area maritime surveillance-reconnaissance 
networks. Communications jamming against 
a potential adversary’s satellites might be 
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be far less escalatory and damaging to the 
orbital environment than a kinetic kill. see 
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for Defeating commercial imagery Systems, 
occasional Paper 39 (Maxwell air force base 
[hereafter afb], ala.: Center for strategy and 
technology, air Univ., december 2005), pp. 
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 24. JP 3-13.4, pp. I-1, I-4. 
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neutralized most major surveillance-radar 
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1944 dragooN landings, one major site was 
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allied Military Deception in the Second world 
war (New york: skyhorse, 2007), p. 619.
 26. see Michael Howard, British intelligence in the 
Second world war, vol. 5, Strategic Deception 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1990), p. 224, and Holt, Deceivers, pp. 83–84. 
Holt also notes that in World War II the U.s. 
Navy developed tactics for disguising low-
campaign-value warships as units of higher 
value but does not seem to have employed 
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 27. examples include the use by the algiers 
landing force during operation torCH in 
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the last moment it was a Malta supply convoy, 
and by the dragooN landing force of a track 
that reinforced german expectations that 
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objective. see francis Harry Hinsley, British 
intelligence in the Second world war, abridged 
version (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1993), p. 259, and Holt, Deceivers, p. 619.
 28. see friedman, network-centric warfare, pp. 
233–35.
 29. for example, this tactic was used by kamikaze 
raiders during World War II, as well as by 
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trainor, general’s war, pp. 263–66.
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on channels typically associated with forces 
or locations not involved in a planned event 
while suppressing activity associated with 
units, etc., that are. In preparation for anti–
pattern analysis measures, deception teams 
collect traffic-pattern data of a unit or force, 
as well as representative samples of message 
content over a long period, including both 
routine (in port or in garrison) and elevated 
(preparation for, or execution of, missions) 
levels of activity. the unit’s or force’s com-
munications can then be modeled and 
simulated with appropriate fidelity; for these 
tactics as applied during World War II, see 
Holt, Deceivers, pp. 85–92. though originally 
conceived for use against data and voice 
radio, anti–pattern analysis tactics are also 
extensible to cyberdeception. 
 31. Military communications facilities in Japan  
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high-frequency radio eMCoN, had the effect 
of convincing U.s. radio-traffic analysts that 
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Slept, pp. 338, 353–54, 362, 424–25, 427, 
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Deception, pp. 25–33, 35–48, 79; and Monsar-
rat, angel on the Yardarm, pp. 126–27.
 35. for Iff spoofing by Japanese kamikazes, see 
stern, Fire from the Sky, p. 155. for a thor-
ough technical overview of the eW waged 
between developers of german radio-guided 
antiship bombs and allied defensive coun-
termeasures, see Martin J. bollinger, warriors 
and wizards: The Development and Defeat 
of radio-controlled glide Bombs of the Third 
reich (annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 
2010). 
 36. for the U.s. Navy’s 1960s-era aN/UlQ-5 and 
-6 blip enhancers, see dwyer, Seaborne Decep-
tion, p. 102. for the 1970s- and- ’80s-era aN/
ssQ-74 Integrated Cover and deception sys-
tem (ICads), see friedman, network-centric 
warfare, pp. 247, 343. Per friedman, ICads 
was housed in a trailer temporarily installed 
on a warship’s flight deck. ICads Phase 1 
allowed its host to simulate an aircraft car-
rier’s telltale radios and radars. ICads Phase 
2 added a false-target generator that could 
deceive soviet airborne and rorsat radars, 
as well as an acoustic element that simulated 
a carrier’s machinery noise to deceive soviet 
submarines. for an overview of mid-to-late-
twentieth-century deceptive eW techniques 
and expendable offboard decoy technolo-
gies, see solomon, “defending the fleet from 
China’s anti-ship ballistic Missile,” pp. 81–87. 
 37. see Kenneth Helberg et al., electronic warfare 
Technology Trends and visions (Wright-
Patterson afb, ohio: research development 
Center, May 1990), pp. 5–7, and P. e. Pace 
et al., Digital image Synthesizers: are enemy 
Sensors really Seeing what’s There? (Mon-
terey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate school, 15 
November 2004).
 38. “Computer network charade,” or CNC, is a 
term suggested by an anonymous reviewer 
of this article, to whom I am grateful for the 
idea.
 39. for outstanding summaries of the poten-
tial uses of disinformation planting and 
honeypots for CNC, as well as the theoretical 
impact of CNC on an adversary’s intelligence 
collection efforts, see fred Cohen, “the Use 
of deception techniques: Honeypots and  
decoys,” n.d., available at all.net/journal/
deception/deception_techniques_.pdf, and 
Neil C. rowe, Deception in Defense of com-
puter Systems from cyber-attack (Monterey, 
Calif.: Naval Postgraduate school, n.d.), 
available at faculty.nps.edu/. rowe’s paper 
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also summarizes high-fidelity deceptive 
simulation of an actual node’s or network’s 
behavior. as with preparation for communi-
cations deception, if a CNC deception team 
has access to node or network behavioral data 
and representative content over the range 
of operating tempos, it ought to be able to 
model and then simulate them in another 
node/network or in a honeypot or net. this 
is an important area for unit- and force-level 
experimentation.
 40. this hypothetical CNC tactic is envisioned 
for the Nonsecure Internet Protocol router 
Network (NIPrNet) and perhaps also the 
secure Internet Protocol router Network 
(sIPrNet). It is not envisioned for operational 
or tactical data-link or distributed fire-control 
networks.
 41. CNC’s relative immaturity means that its 
viability must be proved in war games, 
battle experiments, and developmental tests 
before it can be incorporated in doctrine and 
operational plans. CNC may well prove more 
useful for concealment (saturating adversary 
collection systems and overwhelming deci-
sion makers with sheer volume and ambigu-
ity) than for outright deception. a potentially 
useful way to estimate its combat efficacy 
would be to study historical cases of equiva-
lent communications deception. for example, 
in spring 1942, U.s. naval intelligence used a 
false, unencrypted radio message about Mid-
way Island’s water-purification system to elicit 
enemy communications activity that helped 
verify that Midway was indeed the Imperial 
Japanese Navy’s next target; see Patrick d. 
Weadon, “the battle of Midway,” national 
Security agency / central Security Service, 15 
January 2009, www.nsa.gov/. there is little 
conceptual difference between this episode 
and how CNC might be used in the future. 
 42. the challenges of rapidly obtaining and react-
ing to I&W may make it extremely difficult 
to use decoy forces to successfully induce an 
adversary into wasting precious first-strike 
resources. It also brings the danger of prema-
ture employment of “crown jewel” deception 
tactics. Nevertheless, defending leaders who 
are confident that they understand their 
counterparts’ mind-sets and perceptions well 
enough, have sufficient maneuver space, and 
judge the probability of war to be high may 
decide that even a failed decoy attempt is bet-
ter than waiting passively for their counter-
parts’ first move. 
 43. as an example, a royal Navy sloop that was 
attacked during the luftwaffe’s 27 august 
1943 radio-guided antiship bombing raid—
the second successful one of the war—had 
on board a royal air force elINt collec-
tion team. this embarkation was not typical, 
which suggests british intelligence had antici-
pated the combat debut of the weapon and 
sought to use a relatively low-campaign-value 
task group to collect data that would be useful 
for defending more important forces later. 
In fact, there is circumstantial evidence the 
sloop’s group was deliberately exposed to at-
tract radio-guided antiship bomb attacks; see 
bollinger, warriors and wizards, pp. 6–8, 49. 
a sensor’s emissions or a weapon’s kinematics 
may very well give away design vulnerabili-
ties that, not easily or rapidly correctable,  
can be readily exploited by countermeasures. 
the same may be true of surveillance- 
reconnaissance-strike tactics and decision 
making, in which case early data collection 
may be as important to the defender as induc-
ing the adversary to waste weapons. 
 44. this point is exemplified by the april–July 
1945 okinawa kamikaze campaign. the raids 
were initially high in strength and frequency 
but gradually—though they remained 
lethal—decreased to relative nuisance levels 
as it became apparent to Japanese command-
ers that they were not inflicting significant 
operational or strategic handicaps on the U.s. 
Navy and that new production could barely 
compensate for the aircraft expended. the 
Japanese decided to husband their remain-
ing inventory for intense raids against U.s. 
forces during the anticipated invasion of the 
home islands; see robin l. rielly, Kami-
kazes, corsairs, and Picket Ships: okinawa 
1945 (Havertown, Pa.: Casemate, 2008), pp. 
312–13, 320–22. 
  luftwaffe patterns in employing radio-
guided antiship bombs between July 1943 
and august 1944 also represent an example. 
severe attrition of the specially configured 
bombers and corresponding losses of highly 
trained crews in exchange for no opera-
tional gain led to the redeployment of several 
bomber units from the Mediterranean to 
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northern germany for a planned (though 
never executed) future offensive. Mediterra-
nean radio-guided bombing operations were 
heavily reduced until the anzio landings in 
late January 1944, where heavy attrition led 
to the withdrawal of most of the surviving 
bombers in anticipation of the allied invasion 
of france. by that time, though, sustained 
radio-guided bombing operations were all but 
impossible owing to inadequate bomber and 
bomb production. see bollinger, warriors 
and wizards, pp. 73–74, 88, 118, 145–49.
 45. for experimentally obtained evidence 
regarding the lingering psychological effects 
of a successful deception on an adversary’s 
decision making and tactics, albeit in the 
cyber realm, see Cohen, “Use of deception 
techniques,” pp. 17, 19–20.
 46. see solomon, “defending the fleet from 
China’s anti-ship ballistic Missile,” pp. 40–41, 
45–49, 54–57.
 47. this is the exact principle around which U.s. 
Navy deception and concealment against the 
soss was structured throughout the Cold 
War. see friedman, network-centric warfare, 
p. 224.
 48. though adversaries often use deception and 
concealment to cover first-strike/salvo forces 
as they increase combat readiness and move 
into position, they may also employ decep-
tion within the first strikes/salvos themselves. 
the attacker could launch an initial salvo of 
obsolescent weapons or decoys to entice a 
defending force into revealing its location or 
expending ordnance (or revealing defensive 
eW “tricks”), thereby paving the way for the 
actual strike. defenders might be able to de-
feat such deception by positioning networked 
multi-phenomenology sensors in their outer 
defense-in-depth layers to enable early clas-
sification of inbound threats, with sensor 
data relayed by highly directional line-of-
sight pathways to mitigate interception risk. 
better still is to have a very deep defensive-
ordnance inventory that can support many 
engagements before reloading is needed. this 
may not be practical with respect to missile 
interceptors, which suggests the importance 
of eW countermeasures and future directed-
energy defenses. the ideal option, though, is 
a counterdeception that lures the attacker into 
wasting salvos. this would be very difficult to 
orchestrate in peacetime’s waning moments 
but would seem to offer the greatest reward at 
the least relative cost. 
  the attacker can, alternatively, use sacrificial 
scouts or raiders to elicit defensive responses 
and thereby reveal a force’s positions. this 
gambit could be countered by positioning the 
outer defensive layers far enough from the 
main force so that the former’s actions do not 
directly reveal the latter’s location. follow-
ing the first strike/salvo, offensive counterair 
sweeps well forward of a main force can also 
be used to locate and neutralize adversary 
scouts. the U.s. Navy’s “outer air battle” 
doctrine and tactics of the late Cold War are 
examples of these approaches. see friedman, 
Seapower and Space, pp. 234–39. 
 49. richard K. betts, Surprise attack (Washing-
ton, d.C.: brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 
87–141, 155–56. the psychological factors 
may be especially decisive. a 1975 U.s. Navy 
war game suggested that a soviet first salvo’s 
effectiveness might owe more to the targeted 
crews’ shock upon realizing that inbound 
weapons were real and a war had begun than 
to their ships’ defensive limitations. see fried-
man, Seapower and Space, p. 346.
 50. lyle J. goldstein and yuri M. Zhukov, “a tale 
of two fleets: a russian Perspective on the 
1973 Naval standoff in the Mediterranean,” 
naval war college review 57, no. 2 (spring 
2004), pp. 27–63.
 51. abraham rabinovich, The Yom Kippur war: 
The epic encounter That Transformed the 
Middle east (New york: schocken books, 
2004), pp. 478–79, 483–85. 
 52. tait, “Make smoke!,” pp. 60–61.
 53. optimal first-strike range is not necessarily 
the same as the maximum physical reach of 
the longest-ranged weapon system effective 
against a given target type (i.e., the combined 
range of the firing platform and the weapon it 
carries). rather, it is defined by trade-offs in 
surveillance and reconnaissance effectiveness 
and in the number of weapons employable in 
a short time as the target’s distance from the 
firing platform’s starting position increases. 
this means that a potential adversary with 
a weapon system that can reach distance D 
from the homeland’s border but can achieve 
timely and high-confidence peacetime cueing 
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or targeting only within a radius of 0.75D 
has an optimal first-strike range of 0.75D. It 
follows that if, for technical, operational, or 
logistical reasons, the adversary can fire only 
a few D-range weapons within a defined short 
period of time, and if his doctrine therefore 
calls for using D-range weapons in coordina-
tion with far more plentiful weapons of range 
0.5D, the optimal first-strike range decreases 
to 0.5D. this does not reduce the dangers 
faced by the defender at distance D but does 
offer more flexibility in using force-level 
doctrine, posture, plans, and capabilities to 
manage risks. 
 54. see solomon, “defending the fleet from 
China’s anti-ship ballistic Missile,” p. 131.
 55. these frontline forces have great capacity to 
blunt an adversary’s offensive, and many are 
either relatively invulnerable to countermea-
sures (e.g., submarines, mines) or expendable 
from the campaign-level standpoint (e.g., 
small warships, land-based antiship missiles). 
the types, numbers, capabilities, and posi-
tions of these frontline units are driven by 
the threat as well as geography. defense in 
a choke point, archipelago, or small physi-
cally enclosed sea can be very different from 
defense in a large marginal sea. environ-
mental and endurance factors in the former 
might weight the structure of low-campaign-
value forces toward missile-armed patrol 
boats and short-range, rotary- or fixed-wing 
aircraft, while those factors in the latter might 
favor corvette or frigate-type warships and 
medium-range, fixed-wing aircraft. addition-
ally, ground-force preinsertion assumes that 
a remote, isolated territory is strategically 
worth holding. depending on geography, 
operational needs, and the adversary’s combat 
and logistics capabilities, it may be strategi-
cally beneficial, in both political and military 
terms, to induce the adversary’s seizure of 
a given friendly territory. the defender can 
then wage maritime-denial operations that 
gradually shift the overall theater correlation 
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